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Europe as borderland†

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Abstract. The discussion in this paper moves through three stages. In the first the relation of political spaces and borders to citizenship is interrogated; in the second, notions of deterritorialization and reterritorialization are examined in relation to ideas of the material constitution of Europe; and, in the third section it returns to the issue of citizenship and its relation to cosmopolitanism. Rather than being a solution or a prospect, Europe currently exists as a 'borderland', and this raises a number of issues that need to be confronted.

- I -

In the first part of this discussion I will address the issue of *political spaces* in general terms, in order to show why the question of 'borders' (how to think or figure them, how to define their concept, and their 'institution', in the active sense) is central when we reflect about citizenship, and more generally, about political association. This is, indeed, a way to introduce, once again, the question of the relationship between 'citizenship' as an institution or an ideal, and the historical form of the (European) nation-state. But it is also a way to 'deconstruct' citizenship, to go back to the more general assumptions concerning the 'spatiality' which is implicit in every territorial construction of citizenship as a collective 'identity', a system of rights and duties, normative principles and capabilities. In order to develop this notion of political spaces, I will start with some philosophical considerations on territories and territorialization, which will lead me to a quick return to classical concepts concerning sovereignty, and, finally, I will examine four different (and conflicting) *schemes of projection* of the figure of Europe within the global world. They involve, so it seems to me, very radical dilemmas concerning the 'construction' of Europe as *part of the world*.

This expression 'political space', although perfectly understandable in its literal meaning, I borrow from the remarkable little book by Carlo Galli (2001). His book intends not only to analyze the relationship between the constitution of (political) power and the *control of the space(s)*—microgeographic and macrogeographic—where apparatuses of power are valid, but also, more profoundly, to analyze the 'spatial representations' underlying any concept of power, from 'premodernity' to 'modernity', and from 'modernity' to 'postmodernity'.(1) Galli's concluding remarks appear under

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(1) Carlo Galli teaches political theory at the University of Bologna. He is the author of numerous historical and theoretical works, including a lengthy study of the philosophy of Carl Schmitt (1996), which includes a careful discussion of Schmitt's theory of the '*Nomos* of the Earth' (where the Greek term 'Nomos' is supposed to mean both 'order' and 'distribution'). In many respects, Galli's (2001) book is part of the very active debate which currently tends to provide *alternative 'non-schmittian' solutions*, while acknowledging the importance of the issue of the 'geophilosophical' categories associated with contemporary 'geo-politics'.

the title "The 'necessity' of Europe" (*L'Europa 'necessaria'*). Allow me to quote a few significant sentences:

> "Globalization requires a convenient political space, which is not itself global, in order to fully develop its dynamic potential. To put it shortly, if one wants to avoid at the same time the reactionary reactions to globalization which try to preserve large or small communities, and the tragic nonsense of universalized alienation ... the only possible solution is not necessarily the dream of democratic *cosmopolitanism* ... . The provisory determinations of our space and time also suggest *the European alternative*, a *European space* which would become a land of differences. Not in the sense of the old political geographies, however, in which Europe was seen as the hegemonic center of the World (the era of *Jus publicum Europaeum*), or [in Hegelian terms] the region where the Spirit becomes conscious of itself, or the borderland [between the World Camps] which is like a bleeding wound (the era of the Cold War). We are thinking, rather, of Europe recovering after its nihilistic decline ... no longer fancying to bring salvation to the world, but 'only' to build a singular political space which is not meaningless. Which means: revive *politics* ... , overcome the alleged self-regulations of the market ... . From that angle, Europe as 'different' would be a space irreducible to the mere 'glocal' determinations of automatic domination ... it would be an *alternative space* within the global horizon ... . This also implies that Europe proves able to *draw new borderlines*, to *distinguish* a space where not everything is possible from the global environment ... . Such a Europe would concretely exist as a sovereign space where a *continental political constitution* secures rights for individuals with multiple citizenships, even if in a provisional manner ... . It would be a space of real constitutionalism in the spirit of Montesquieu's 'coordination of differences' " (2001, pages 169 – 171, emphasis in original).

These are very useful suggestions. They express a political commitment in the European conjuncture, which I tend to accept myself, one reducible neither to 'globalism' in whichever variety nor to the defense of national sovereignties. They try to pose a problem, not to picture solutions. Theoretically, they can be developed with the help of two additional remarks.

First, *the 'political space' has a necessary relation to the 'public space', but is not completely synonymous with it.* A political space becomes a public space (or 'sphere') when (and inasmuch as) it is not only 'mapped' by sovereign powers (including supranational organizations), or imposed by economic forces (the 'automatic domination of the market'), but also 'used' and 'instituted' (or *constituted*) by civic practices, debates, forms of representations, and social conflicts, hence ideological antagonisms over culture, religion, and secularism, etc. Such a process of emergence of the 'public' (which has very ancient roots in the deliberative practices of the 'city-states', later in the development of the *civil society* of the Enlightenment era) acquired its modern figure with the reversal of the Prince's sovereignty into the 'sovereignty of the people', or 'the nation'. Which is a juridical *fiction*, but one that engages a *dialectic* of institutional transformations, *the political* itself. It always presupposes a *geography* of memberships and representations, of 'constituencies' and 'locations' (or 'sites') of power, of unified and isolated territories. In other terms, every public space is, by definition, a political space, but not every political space is (already) a public space.

Hence, a second remark. It is, indeed, a commonplace among historians (and probably also geographers) that the constitution of the modern nation-state—through the 'invention' of borders, which replaced the ancient forms of 'marches' or 'limes', combining on the same 'line' administrative, juridical, fiscal, military, even linguistic functions—was, in particular, a transformation of the (more or less indefinite,

heterogeneous) *space* into *territories* controlled by a 'monopolistic' state power, thus rendered 'homogeneous'. This could be called generally a process of *the territorialization of space*, which forms a *precondition* for the emergence of 'politics' as such, in the modern sense (see, for example, Nordman, 1998, page 522). But it is also a very one-sided and mechanical representation, at least philosophically. As Deleuze and Guattari have explained in their seminal (sometimes also fantastic) book, *A Thousand Plateaux*, any process of 'territorialization' is also the reverse side of another, opposite, process of 'deterritorialization', which takes place before, or after, or simultaneously (1980, page 17). This can be understood, of course, only if one uses a *generalized concept of 'territory'*, which includes not only the division and articulation of spatial units, but also their institutional counterparts, whereby *power structures* shape spaces, languages, moralities, symbols, labor distribution, and productive activities, etc. To 'territorialize' means to assign 'identities' for collective subjects within structures of power, and, therefore, to *categorize and individualize* human beings—and the figure of the 'citizen' (with its statutory conditions of birth and place, its different subcategories, spheres of activity, processes of formation) is exactly a way of categorizing individuals. Such a process is possible only if other figures of the 'subject' are violently or peacefully removed, coercively, or voluntarily destroyed. It is also always haunted, as it were, by the possibility that *outsiders* or 'nomadic subjects', in the broad sense, *resist territorialization*, remain located outside the normative 'political space', in the land of (political) *nowhere* which can also become a *counterpolitical* or an *antipolitical* space (for which Michel Foucault coined the expression *heterotopia*). This movement seems to be, at the same time, attractive and—when reaching a certain degree or involving a certain critical mass—*unbearable* both for the established authorities and for the subjects themselves.[(2)]

Territories in our political tradition—the one which has become associated with the 'European model' of the nation-states and the international law governing their relations (in particular, the alternation of war and peace, the *ius publicum europaeum*)—are not only associated with the 'invention' of the border, but also inseparable from the institution of power as *sovereignty*. More precisely, they combine in a single unity the institutions of (absolute) sovereignty, the border, and the government of populations. Borderlines which allow a clear distinction between the *national* (*domestic*) and the *foreigner* express sovereignty as a power to attach populations to territories in a stable or regulated manner, to 'administrate' the territory through the control of the population, and, conversely, to govern the population through the division and the survey of the territory. This is especially clear in early classical thinkers of the absolute monarchy, such as Bodin, who defines the (national) citizen as combining private freedom and public subjection on a given territory—"*franc subject tenant de la souveraineté d'autrui*" (a free/franchised subject under the rule of a sovereign) (Bodin, 1986 [1576], page 112). The most important 'marks' of sovereignty (a terminology also used by Hobbes) concern the use of borders to secure the fiscal administration of the territory and the settlement of religious conflicts among the population through the preeminence of the state's authority within the national borders. The state then becomes the 'representative of the people' (or, the common interests of the people, against its 'sectarian' interests or the interests of specific subgroups) on 'its' territory. But, as the sovereignty of the absolute monarch becomes replaced by the sovereignty of the (absolute) people, or its abstract incarnation the (democratic) state, this structure of appropriation becomes able to work in both directions: *the citizens 'belong' to the state,*

[(2)] On the historical 'play on words' which identifies 'subjects' with 'subjects' (*subiecti*, *subditi*) who either *become citizens* or *qualify the citizen*, see Balibar (1991; 2003a).

which, in turn, is their 'property', or 'belongs' to them in an exclusive manner. Ceteris paribus, this keeps going provided the 'nomads' or 'strangers' are not too numerous within the territory and active in the economic and cultural life—that is, do not disturb the representation of the population for itself as unified 'people'. This is one of the major reasons why modern states, but also their citizens, are so reluctant to accept the idea of 'multiple citizenships', or view it unfavorably, refusing to consider it a 'normal' pattern and associating it with dubious loyalty with regard to the state and the fellow citizens, a sort of detachment of the citizen from the territory which would also blur his or her identity secured by some 'internal borders'.[3] The absolutization and sacralization of borders is perhaps even greater in the democratic state than in the monarchic state, which invented it, precisely because it expresses now the fact that the state is ideally the *people's property* just as it is the eminent representative/owner of the population's rights.

But, as we know, this status has been relativized in the history of the 20th century, already before the official advent of 'globalization', especially in the case of the European territories, both in the form of the emergence of supranational (super)borders, and in the form of a progressive dismantling of the multiple administrative functions of the national borders: some being steadily reinforced (particularly the police function, controlling the flows of immigrants, etc), others being weakened and separated from the borderline (eg the monetary independence or the fiscal control). As a consequence, the constitutive relationship between territory, population, and sovereignty is no longer taken for granted, at least when seen 'from outside'. It tends to be replaced by various forms of mobile equilibrium between 'internal' and 'external' conflicting forces, *and* substituted by stronger and broader 'global borders', which appear as territorial projections of the political world order (or disorder). The first example of such institutions was the 'iron curtain' during the Cold War or the East–West (communist–capitalist) divide. Far from disappearing with the 'end' of the Cold War and the collapse of communism as a political regime ruling over a territorial 'empire', they tended to give place to the idea of a great 'North–South' divide along clear lines separating the developed and the underdeveloped countries, which was never officially accepted. They are now more important than ever, but also more complex, fraught with uncertainties and ideological conflicts concerning the local projections of the global order, or the very possibilities of representing this 'order' as a spatial system (a deterritorialized and reterritorialized organization of public power). This is particularly visible in the case of Europe, and constantly affects the definition of the kind of 'entity' that can be legitimately called 'Europe'. Officially defined as a confederation of independent states, each 'carrying with itself', as it were, its own limits (and *contributing* to the establishment of 'common limits', just as, according to the rules established by the Maastricht Treaty, each is contributing to the establishment of a 'common citizenship'), the European Union (EU) is in principle open to indefinite expansion without preestablished limits, while leaving outside or 'excluding' some territories historically considered 'European'. The member states are subjecting themselves voluntarily to some supranational authorities, while maintaining completely heterogeneous attitudes with respect to certain traditional 'marks' of sovereignty (monetary policy, military integration and alliances, border control, etc). The EU is, therefore, as much permeated

[3] I have discussed the idea of the 'internal border', or internalization of borders, as the ideal form of reciprocity between the 'I' and the 'Us' in the organic unity of the people, an expression invented by the great German national(ist) philosopher Fichte (Balibar, 1994).

or 'invaded' by the world through its borders as it is 'protected' or 'isolated' by them from the rest of the world.[4]

For this reason, I want to finish this first part indicating *four conflicting patterns* of 'political spaces' which directly concern the representation of the European borders. They seem to be largely incompatible, which also explains why they tend to be associated with *opposite policies* concerning nationality and citizenship, residence and mobility, activity and security: in short, opposite ways of 'constituting' Europe (or, possibly, resisting its constitution). I shall call them, respectively: the *clash-of-civilizations pattern*; the *global network pattern*; the *center – periphery pattern*; and, finally, the *crossover pattern*, corresponding to a representation of Europe as 'borderland'. Allow me to comment briefly on each of them.

First, the clash-of-civilization pattern. Anybody who has read the now famous book with this title by Samuel Huntington (deriving from an earlier essay from 1993 and first published in 1996), which is supposed to have inspired many of the 'neoconservative' policies now implemented by the US administration, must have been intrigued by the way in which 'strategic' maps of the actual or potential divisions of the world among supranational entities in the era after the Cold War become associated with a notion of 'civilization' which seems to arise from a remote past in world history. This paradoxical combination becomes more understandable if we realize that Huntington's notion of 'civilization' (or, indeed, civilizational 'space', civilization within essential boundaries, even if they are conceived as empirically unstable and fuzzy) does not so much derive from Arnold Toynbee (the main source quoted by Huntington) as from the idea of 'geopolitical spaces' or *Grossräume* that was elaborated by Schmitt during and immediately after World War II.[5] The reason why Huntington wants 'religion' or, better said, religious collective *identities* (which, to follow him, far exceed and long survive religious practices and beliefs themselves) to form the core of the 'cultural' antagonisms which will characterize the era of globalization is not that he believes politics to be withering away, as some theorists of the 'end of history' do, but, rather, that he sees religion (after nationalism, economic interests, 'ideologies') becoming—or becoming again (this is *la revanche de Dieu*, the expression coined by French Islamologist Gilles Kepel)—the ultimate root of *political conflict* and the most radical

[4] A very strange tautology is included in the official 'definition' of the EU, inscribed in the draft constitution, that proves more and more difficult to handle: the union is said to be "open for any European state that respects its values", but which states—apart from those already admitted—are 'European', and which are not? The 'Europeans' are now doubly embarrassed: they have to decide whether Turkey but also Ukraine and other countries from the former Soviet Union, possibly also Morocco, Israel, and Palestine, and in the end Russia itself, which 'respect the values' or may start respecting them, are also 'European', and if countries already admitted which are 'undoubtedly' European and seem not to keep faithful to the 'European values' (such as Austria, Italy... but why rule out any other?) should then be expelled or suspended from their membership.

[5] The Schmittian idea of the *Grossräume*, which served the expansionary goals of Nazi Germany in and outside Europe, claimed to be a generalization of the 'Monroe Doctrine', leading to a division of the world among several competing geopolitical spaces, each dominated by one hegemonic power (or, as Huntington would put it, 'core state'), in particular: an East Asian *Grossraum*, dominated by Japanese imperialism, an All-American Grossraum, dominated by US imperialism, and a European (or Euro-Mediterranean) Grossraum, dominated by German imperialism. The idea of the Grossraum is still present, possibly with some pragmatic changes, behind the analysis of the crisis of the *Jus Publicum Europaeum* based on diplomatic and military equilibrium of power among nation-states (an idea entirely resumed by Huntington), the critique of the 'universalistic' attempts at creating a peaceful world order through legal constraints and institutions, such as the League of Nations or the United Nations (idem), and the prospects of a new 'distribution of the Earth', exposed in the great book *Der Nomos der Erde* (Schmitt, 1951; see Balibar, 2003b, pages 141 – 157; Kervégan, 2004).

source of *power politics*, according to the Schmittian 'criterion of the political': the *friend versus enemy distinction*. In this view, the main stake of politics becomes the drawing, defense, challenging, and redrawing of 'civilizational borders' (or, rather, super-borders). These borders sometimes coincide with national borders, sometimes not, especially in the case of 'multicultural' or 'heterogeneous' states, which are the potential site of 'fault-line wars' (these 'normally' should lead to *partitions*, such as in Kashmir, Cyprus, Palestine, Ukraine, except that the competing groups regularly reject this 'rational' solution). For some analysts of the Islamic–Western antagonisms, such as Kepel himself, it is *Europe* as such which now appears as a 'fault line' or an intermediary zone of competition between rival civilizations and opposite power politics.(6)

The reverse side of the strategic importance of civilizational disputed borderlines is open or endemic *war*, which, however, can ideally take two different forms: 'core-state wars' between dominant powers from each civilization—a pattern which would apply best to a potential confrontation between the West and the rising superpower of the East (China)—and 'fault-line wars' supposedly arising from local conflicts which acquire a global meaning, where antagonistic civilizations intertwine (such as the Islamic and Christian-Western civilization in the Middle East and the Mediterranean). Apart from its logical difficulties (in many respects, this picture bears the characters of a circular 'self-fulfilling prophecy') and the empirical problems concerning the list and representations of the various 'civilizations', this model is certainly a very powerful one, adapting ancient geopolitical models, and open to new adaptations depending on the conjuncture. It is, in particular, influencing representations of the more or less antagonistic 'Euro-American divide' (some view it now as a 'clash'), which increasingly refer not only to competing economic interests, but also to 'cultural' differences, including the difference over the political role of religion (Europe or its dominant 'core' being more 'secular' and America including the US being more 'religious' and open to fundamentalist currents). The fact that there is now a deep uncertainty as to whether Europe and America belong to a single 'civilizational' *Grossraum* or whether they belong to separated *Grossräume* (just as there is uncertainty and political controversy as to whether Anglo-Saxon and Hispanic Americas belong to the same

(6) See Kepel (2004), which criticizes Huntington's vision of a 'homogeneous' Islam. This mirrors the vision of a homogeneous West adopted by Islamic fundamentalists. But he anticipates a 'battle of Europe', whose actors and targets will be the Muslim populations of Europe, which will decide the political future of the continent, as it was the case in the last century with the Cold War between communist parties and Western democracies. The same idea was put forward in a much more brutal manner by the British historian of imperialism Niall Ferguson (2004), linking the 'aging' of the European population with an increase in immigration from mostly Muslim countries, thus reversing the ethnic–religious proportions in the long or middle run:

> "A youthful Muslim society to the south and east of the Mediterranean is poised to colonize—the term is not too strong—a senescent Europe. This prospect is all the more significant when considered alongside the decline of European Christianity. In the Netherlands, Britain, Germany, Sweden and Denmark today, fewer than 1 in 10 people now attend church once a month or more. ...While the social and sexual freedoms that matter to such societies are antithetical to Muslim fundamentalism, their religious tolerance leaves these societies weak in the face of fanaticism. What the consequences of these changes will be is very difficult to say. A creeping Islamicization and a decadent Christendom is one conceivable result: while the old Europeans get even older and their religious faith weaker, the Muslim colonies within their cities get larger and more overt in their religious observance. A backlash against immigration by the economically Neanderthal right is another: aging electorates turn to demagogues who offer sealed borders without explaining who exactly is going to pay for the pensions and health care. Nor can we rule out the possibility of a happy fusion between rapidly secularized second-generation Muslims and their post-Christian neighbors. Indeed, we may conceivably end up with all three: Situation 1 in France, Situation 2 in Austria, and Situation 3 in Britain."

'Christian' civilization),[7] clearly enhances, and not diminishes, the relevance of the clash-of-civilization pattern for many of its current supporters, on both sides of the Atlantic.

A second pattern, directly opposing this logic, could be called the global network pattern. It is less easily represented on a map (perhaps because maps as such are so essentially associated with the figure of boundaries and borders), but it can be 'projected' onto maps, at least in an allegoric manner. For this reason, the global network also embodies the idea of a limit of traditional representations of political spaces, the reaching of a historical point where the political space becomes hardly representable, because its structures are constantly changing, a point where 'territorialization' would become a mere transitory aspect of a more basic process of 'deterritorialization', and not the reverse. This can be also associated with the idea of a *primacy of circulation processes* ('flows' of humans, commodities and capitals, 'ideas', information, cultural patterns, etc) over all processes that are fixed and local, based on the occupation and use of territories—be they material (production, consumption), or institutional (administration, education, or the exercise of power in general). Such a notion does not necessarily deprive boundaries of every meaning, but it relativizes their function, detaches them from the idea of sovereignty (or this idea becomes also relativized, since it was precisely associated with stable borders). It makes them, as it were, a 'transitional object', and an object of permanent transgression. This is where, in particular, the representations of *diasporic* and *nomadic subjects* start competing with each other and with the representation of *rooted, embedded subjects*, and potentially replace the latter.

I want to draw your attention, however, to the fact that there are virtually at least *two antagonistic conceptions* of the global network developed today, whose difference is, indeed, political. Both seem to derive from a classical idea of *commerce*, in the broad sense—where *commerce*, or *intercourse* (*Verkehr* in German) encompasses not only a circulation of commodities, a *Handel*, but also many other circulations. You can retrieve this in the idea that the decisive form in which economic and cultural communications are structuring the global (civil) society today is a commercial and information network linking together the 'world cities' with their transportation and accommodation facilities. I am thinking particularly of Manuel Castells's view of the 'network society', but also Saskia Sassen's exposition of the "new geography of power" whereby "state sovereignty is being partly decentered onto non- or quasi-governmental entities for the governance of the global economy and international political order" (1996, page 98). This is also pretty much the way in which Nigel Thrift describes the emergence of a 'phantom state' and a 'global ruling class', whose life is taking place no longer mainly on a national territory, but in a permanent exchange of messages and physical 'change of place' among world cities, mega-airports, entertainment and leisure places around the world, etc (1996, especially pages 213–255). But you can also retrieve it in the *altermondialiste* view that movements of 'resistance', which in a sense forecast the world of tomorrow (or incarnate the 'new world' that is growing within the womb of the 'old', and against it), are no longer either *national* movements (such as the classical 'liberation movements') or even *international* movements in the proper sense (as the socialist and communist movements, based on a class ideology, tended to become), but, rather, *ubiquitous* 'movements of movements', which typically take the form of a network of heterogeneous struggles (ecologist, feminist,

[7] Huntington's personal position on this issue is not equivocal, in spite of the apparent contradiction with his 'religious' criterion (which, in this case, is practically substituted by race) (see 2004). It would not be difficult to find equivalents in European political theory describing the 'Islamic challenge'.

urban, pacifist, etc) alternatively gathering and separating, always in different places.[8] *Flows of migrant populations* (workers, refugees), which political theorists thinking about the new problems of 'global governance' view as a reality "shaped by forces ranging from economic globalization to international agreements on human rights" (Sassen, 1996), are also easily seen as a potential basis for the stretching of the network of resistances to the dimensions of the world, either through their intrinsic tendency to claim rights and resist state repression, or through the solidarity initiatives that their miserable conditions and struggles for recognition can provoke locally.[9]

What is also interesting is that both versions tend to associate the idea of the global network with *names of cities*, except that in the first case the cities are the great financial and executive centers of the world—New York, Los Angeles, Tokyo, London, Amsterdam, Singapore, Shanghai—plus some second-rank candidates—Berlin, Moscow, Paris, Johannesburg, Sao Paulo, Lagos, etc. Whereas in the second case the 'knots' of the network are places where spectacular or symbolic 'events' of the movement are taking place: Porto Alegre, Seattle, Genova, Bombay/Mumbai. They partially intersect, but their 'encounter' is mainly ideal, or virtual. This can also be interpreted in the following way: the tension within the global network, opposing a dominant and a revolutionary realization, is also a competition for the use of a third, virtual, space, in the technological sense—the web of electronic communications. It is, therefore, above all this (hyper)space (the one that is, by definition, less representable) which ought to be called a 'political space', a space of political conflict and public debate where a 'citizenship of the world', transnational by definition, would be taking shape. Pushed to the extreme, this leads to the idea that the 'virtual' has become today the 'real' of politics.[10]

When applied to the discussion of European identity and the orientation of current political processes in Europe (the so-called 'European construction'), the idea of the global network in its two antagonistic versions (which, nonetheless, share many common assumptions, 'postmodernist' in the broad sense) has another paradoxical consequence (but one which many thinkers today tend to accept)—namely, *the dissolution of the object* itself. 'Europe', in a sense, is a phantom of the past, a name that 'is history' rather than society, politics, or economics, since the flows of capitalization, population, communication, and political action, *cross its territory*, investing in its cities and workplaces, but do not *elect it* as a permanent or specific site. Europe is not only deterritorialized, but also delocalized, put 'out of itself', and in the end deconstructed. It may be part of the imaginary, but less and less of the real.

This is clearly not the case with the third pattern which I want to take into account. I call it the 'center–periphery model', which again refers to some important discussions. The idea of the opposition between center and periphery has been particularly elaborated by Immanuel Wallerstein, in the wake of the pioneering work of Fernand Braudel and as part of debates among neo-Marxist critiques of the notion of 'development' in the Third World. It aims at describing the structure (ie relations of economic dependency and power relations) of the 'capitalist world-system', which originated in the first phase of capitalist expansion in the 16th century, and has received successive

[8] For an attempt at raising this idea to the level of a grand theory of history and politics, see Hardt and Negri (2004).

[9] I leave aside here the extreme version, reversing the idea of 'network resistance' to picture it as a decentered *conspiracy* which would include terrorist organizations and anticapitalist movements (sometimes also criminal organizations), against which another network of global survey and interventions should be developed.

[10] This is, notoriously, the core of the 'dialectic' of globalization and antiglobalization in Manuel Castells's view of the rise of the 'network society'. For a recent discussion, see Waterman (1998).

forms since then (see Wallerstein, 1974 – 89; 1991). Typical of this representation are four closely related ideas: the first is that the articulation of political and economic processes in modern societies is always already determined at a global or 'world' level. Globalization is not a 'late' product of the transformation of capitalism into imperialism, but it was already there since the great discoveries of the 16th century, which laid the bases for the development of capitalism as a mode of production, the transformation of medieval kingdoms into modern nation-states (in the 'core' area, one country after the other), and the emergence of 'universalistic' ideologies. The second is that a world system of economies and states also means an international division of labor: not only a specialization of certain regions and countries around certain types of products (industrial, raw material, agriculture, etc), but, above all, a hierarchization of the labor force, with or without compensatory migrations, and corresponding ideological representations of 'different humankinds' (which explains, at least in part, why racism, in general, is 'structural' in such a world system). The third is that a center – periphery pattern is not a simple binary opposition (such as 'North – South', or 'developed – underdeveloped'); it involves more concentric divisions (this is why, in particular, in his history of the structural changes of the world system, Wallerstein always gives a great importance to 'semiperipheries', shifting between center and periphery, which are 'hot places' of the fusion of nationalism and class ideologies, and to 'external arenas', not yet incorporated in the system, which are seen as frontiers of civilization). The fourth idea is that decisive aspects of the *political* implications of this *spatial* pattern are, on the one hand, the episodes of 'struggle in the core', which lead to successive 'hegemonies' over the world system,[(11)] and, on the other hand, 'feedback' effects or a backlash of events taking place in the periphery (decolonization being a perfect example).

Now, it seems to me that one privileged field where center – periphery models are continuously applied in today's scientific and political debate is precisely the field of 'European construction'. This may appear as a particularistic restriction—even if we suggest, which is not entirely clear, that similar applications can be made to other regions of the world, where the construction of economic – political *ensembles* is also envisaged (but which of them is equally advanced as Europe?)—since the center – periphery pattern was meant, at least in the last period, to describe the *whole* world structure. It may suggest that a new episode of 'struggle in the core' is now beginning, where Europe rivals other 'central' powers, the US but also the Far East. It may also suggest, however, that, in reality, the center – periphery pattern *as such* always remained profoundly *eurocentric*, even when it was meant to reverse the traditional European (colonialist) view of history, where Europe was the *only* site of decisive historical processes, and even if the historic center of the world system has progressively moved from Europe itself to 'new Europe' (ie the 'white' colonies of Northern America and Australasia). And perhaps this should be no complete surprise if we remember that the idea of a capitalist world system (beginning with the discussions on *Weltwirtschaft* and world economy) was first elaborated as a 'determinate negation' (as Hegelians would say) of the idea of a world empire' (ie an empire which claims to represent the sovereign source of power, peace, civilization, amid less civilized populations, whose prototype, in the West, was the Roman Empire). To be sure, a capitalist world system is not conceived as a single political and territorial entity; it leads to the *negation* of this institution (in part mythical) of the sovereign territory. But it certainly

[(11)] This is usually the leading nation in industrial and financial affairs, which tends to acquire the means of military supremacy as well, but becomes inevitably challenged on both accounts: Spain, Holland, France, Britain, the US, with Germany as a permanent challenger in the 19th and 20th century. But it is *not* the Soviet Union, in Wallerstein's view.

maintains, precisely, the concentric representation of power relations that was associated with the notion of empire, albeit in a more complex manner. This is also what we typically observe in many discussions and controversies concerning the construction of Europe, which are predicated around the issues of successive enlargements of the European entity (now called 'European Union'), the so-called 'continental imperative' (see Foucher, 1993, pages 280 – 311), the kind of 'power' (*puissance*) that can be reached through the achievement of the European construction, and the preferable location of its 'security border'. Many a European politician (especially in France and Germany) now refers to the idea that Europe is made of 'three concentric circles': the core countries with a single currency (some columnists call this first circle 'Euroland'), the broader circle of other European countries which cannot or refuse to adopt the euro, and the 'periphery' which is not 'part of Europe' but should be as closely associated with it as possible, for economic and security reasons.[12]

These debates are focusing on the series of maps that show how 'Europe' as a political entity passed from its initial nucleus at the time of the Cold War and the 'Economic Community' of six founding members (Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Luxemburg, and the Netherlands) (1951) to the present EU with twenty-five member states (2004). Already, the successive stages of this enlargement process, in spite of its contingencies (eg when some admissions in the end were not ratified by the popular vote, as in the cases of Norway or Switzerland), picture a series of concentric circles which do not only have a chronological meaning. This is, of course, even more the case if you add another series of circles involving the states with a more or less transitory status of 'applicants', 'associates', 'privileged partners', etc, including countries from the former Soviet Empire (or 'camp'), or from around the Mediterranean, or belonging to the ex-colonies of European powers (mainly France). The underlying assumption is that the more countries you include the less easily you can 'integrate' them. And also: the further away they are located with respect to the 'center' of the historical 'nucleus',[13] the more difficult it becomes to control the borderlines (remote borders would tend to return to the old figure of the imperial 'marches'). The more likely also it would be that there would be problems of unequal economic development (poverty gaps) and problems of cultural heterogeneity (a code word for the idea that, on the margins, 'European' cultures are permeated and overlap with 'non-European' influences, which could impede the process of the 'Europeanization of Europe').[14] These are the typical presuppositions underlying current discussions about the possible admission of Turkey (which had become an 'associate nation' as early as 1963!) Comparisons with the Russian or the British case are even more revealing. Although in all three cases (which, in the past centuries, were either included in or excluded from the European 'political equilibrium', depending on the circumstances) we have to deal with political entities whose cultural or political or economic ties with other regions of the world were at least as important as their ties with the European space, it is fairly clear that, in the current dominant representation, the political

[12] This position has been advocated in France by very different ideologues, such as the socialist leader Paul Quilès (an opponent of the constitutional project). An interesting discussion of the strategic dilemmas of 'broader Europe' as a system of concentric regions can be found in Hassner (2003).

[13] Although this notion of *distance* is practically very difficult to define, witness the number of apparent exceptions, in the Balkans or elsewhere: it is a combination of geography and 'culture'. Ultimately it is a *political distance*, rather than a pure geographic one.

[14] This seemingly paradoxical formula was not coined, as I believed (see 2003c, page 4), by the Albanian national writer Ismael Kadaré during the war in former Yugoslavia. It is already there in previous writings (eg Stern, 1989).

divergences between Britain (which is not a member of the European currency system and keeps 'special relations' with the US) and France or Germany are considered 'internal' to the model of the (political) 'struggle in the core', whereas Turkey (as possibly Ukraine) is left on the 'periphery', and Russia (for how long?) is left in the 'external arena'.

The fourth (and last) pattern that I want to introduce is the one that I call crossover, 'overlapping folds', or *nappes superposées*. I drew a simplified picture of how it looks on the cover page of my book *Les frontières de la démocratie* (published in 1992): showing three open overlapping spaces ('Euro-Atlantic', 'Euro-Mediterranean', and 'Euro-Asiatic', if you like, but these are symbolic rather than realistic nominations) which intersect over the projected territory of Europe. This is a schematic projection of an idea that can be found in many contemporary critiques of the notion of 'pure' cultural identity: especially the 'postcolonial' writers, but also historians and anthropologists of the 'Euro-Mediterranean' civilization, sociologists working on the 'Atlantic passage' (either in its dominant 'white' version, or in its subaltern 'black' version). It is also, more empirically, latent in the works of writers, geographers, and political theorists who examine the prospects of 'border zones' of the new European space, such as the 'Baltic Rim', the 'Danubian region', the 'Euro-Mediterranean', the 'Trans-Manche' (Cross-Channel region), who, albeit frequently describing the same 'facts' as in the old theories of *Mitteleuropa*, reverse their meaning, by insisting on the idea that in the very 'heart' of Europe all languages, religions, cultures are coexisting and mixing, with origins and connections all over the world. If this is a 'middle', then, it is not a center, but, rather, 'a series of assembled peripheries', as Edward Said put it in one of his last interviews speaking about 'major' and 'minor' literatures (Katz and Smith, 2003).[15] There is no 'center'; there are only 'peripheries'. Or, better said, *each region of Europe* is or could be considered a 'center' in its own right, because it is made of overlapping peripheries, each of them *open* (through 'invasions', 'conquests', 'refuges', 'colonizations', and 'postcolonial migrations', etc) to influences from all other parts of Europe, and from the whole world. This creates a potential for ethnic and religious conflicts, but also for hybridity and cultural invention. It is in this sense that, in previous essays, I suggested that, far from representing an exception and an anomaly, the Balkan patchwork (whose tragedy is largely Europe's responsibility, for want of a unified, firm, and generous policy towards the various components of former socialist Yugoslavia) should be considered rather an epitome and an allegory of Europe as such (see Balibar, 2002). It is impossible to represent Europe's history as a story of *pure identities*, running the danger of becoming progressively *alienated*. Its history can be represented only in terms of *constructed identities*, dependent on a series of successive *encounters* between 'civilizations' (if one wants to keep the word), which keep taking place *within* the European space, enclosing populations and cultural patterns from the whole world. Just as it is necessary to acknowledge that in each of its 'regions' Europe always remains heterogeneous and *differs from itself* as much as it *differs from others* (including the 'new Europes' elsewhere in the world). This *différance*, to put it in Derridian terminology, both internal and external, is irreducible. Which leads to the political conclusion that Europe's heterogeneity can be politically *mediated*, but cannot be *eliminated*. In this sense, only a 'federal' vision of Europe, preserving its cultural differences *and* solidarities, can provide a viable historical project for the 'supranational' public sphere (Nicolaïdis, 2004; Nicolaïdis and Lacroix, 2003).

[15] Printed as posthumous homage in this journal. Similar ideas are expressed in Said's critique of Huntington in 2000.

Before I move to the other side of my presentation, allow me to add one general remark: each of the patterns that I have presented in an abstract and cursory manner is not only a way to figure a 'political space', involving a different idea of the intrinsic relationship between politics and spatiality, but also a different way to understand what a 'border' exactly means, how it works, and how it is reproduced. In another circumstance—already reflecting on the example of the European space and its role in the generalization of the institution of the 'border'—I suggested that every border has a *double meaning*, local and global: it is a 'line' (more or less accepted, stable, permeable, visible, thick or thin) separating territories which, by virtue of its drawing, become 'foreign'; and it is a 'partition' or 'distribution' of the world space, which reflects the regime of meaning and power under which the world is represented as a 'unity' of different 'parts' (Balibar, 2002). The future regime of borders—both in the middle of the European space and at its extremities—is certainly one of the crucial stakes and enigmas of the coming period, as it is also in other parts of the world. Imaginary patterns of 'political spaces' as clashing of civilizations, global network, center – periphery, or crossover are also, in a sense, attempts at forecasting (and actually determining, in a typical 'normative' and 'performative' mode) the coming regime of local – global borders, the way in which they locally reflect a global order (or disorder) and confer a 'universal' meaning upon local differences. Each of them, in this sense, expresses a *decision* over the status of borders. We may now examine some of the consequences of such decisions, already made or simply anticipated.

- II -

In the second part of this discussion, I want to resume the dialectics of 'territorialization' and 'deterritorialization' in a somewhat different manner. I think that conflicting patterns of 'political spaces' applied to the representation of Europe's 'figure' in the world can be used as touchstones to distinguish between policies that affect, at the same time, its 'interior' and its 'exterior.' (We might have to create neologisms to think about more complex political situations, beyond this 'amphibological' distinction, as Kant used to say: Habermas speaks of *Weltinnenpolitik* ('world domestic politics') in a sense that could be understood this way;[16] but it could be equally relevant to stress the fact that 'domestic problems' now also immediately belong to *Aussenpolitik* (eg the problems of religious tolerance when Islam is involved). I have chosen the two topics of *security policies* which aim at regulating and controlling the entrance of asylum seekers and migrants into the European 'common space' (where 'European' refers to the EU, but also some other countries which have denied their admission into the union but are integrated in the security system, such as Switzerland), and 'cultural' difference, inasmuch as it is rooted in a 'map' of *linguistic differences*, which poses problems but also provides resources for the constitution and self-understanding of a European *identity. Security identity:* this choice may appear partial and unbalanced, since it combines two very different kinds of issues, some brutally realistic on one side, some

[16] Kant's characterization of the 'interior/exterior' distinction as an 'amphibological' one can be found in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, additional section to the *Transcendental Analytics*. Amphibological' means that it cannot be used without contradicting itself. (This is because an 'interior' space is also, qua space, a part of 'exteriority', we might add: it is also because every 'interior' includes elements of *otherness* or *strangeness* that are perceived as 'exterior'). The oxymoronic notion of *Weltinnenpolitik* ('world domestic politics') seems to have been invented by the former German President Richard von Weiszäcker. It is widely used by Habermas in his recent publications on the 'postnational constellation' (2001) and, after him, by such legal theorists as Luigi Ferrajoli (see Balibar, 2003b, pages 114 – 125).

apparently more speculative and abstract on the other side. But, in reality—apart from the fact that I happen to have been involved in recent years in activities and debates which (in different frameworks) concerned the 'freedom of circulation' as well as the 'translation between cultures' (see Balibar et al, 1999; Glasson-Deschaumes, 2002)—it is precisely my intention to suggest that what we may call the 'material constitution' of Europe, underlying the emergence of the 'European citizen' as a new historic figure, actually oscillates, in a highly tensed manner, between two such poles or extremities. On the one hand, there is a *violent process of exclusion* whose main instrument (not the only one) is the quasi-military enforcement of 'security borders', which recreates the figure of the *stranger as political enemy*, pushing the European construction in the direction of a 'translation' of economic disparities and social antagonisms into the language of culture wars and clashes of civilization, which is potentially exterministic. On the other hand, there is a *'civil' process of elaboration of differences*, which clearly involves difficult issues concerning our educational systems and cultural policies, even perhaps a basic aporia concerning the self-understanding of Europe's 'identity' and 'community'. But it could also paradoxically become an effective instrument to neutralize and work through cultural 'wars' (including religious or pseudo-religious cultural wars), thus opening a way out of the embarrassments of 'integration' and 'assimilation', and giving the now very contested idea of a 'multicultural Europe' an *active, progressive content*. In short, in this section of my presentation I want to tentatively indicate *one* possible path (perhaps utopian, and in any case not to be isolated from other political conditions) in order to 'civilize' the notion of cultural identity, which proves so difficult to disentangle from the idea of a 'community of citizens', exchanging our representation of the 'other' as enemy or alien for a representation of the 'other' as problematic interlocutory, whose 'difference' is a puzzle, but also a resource and a wealth.

Let me start with some elements from a recent debate with Sandro Mezzadra around the issue of 'glocal' wars of elimination, if not yet extermination, on the *ubiquitous* borderlines of Fortress Europe.[17] Mezzadra's attempt (which I find both timely and suggestive) is to expand the model of 'war' to the study of the violent processes of control and suppression which target 'illegal migrations' and also affect asylum seekers at the 'outer borders' of the so-called *Schengen space*. He also aims to show its political function in a world of rapidly expanding exploitation of 'nomadic' labor force which is also a world of endemic violence or overt wars (in particular, in the 'South', through either internal conflicts or external interventions, where they add to the insecurity and the uprooting of entire populations). He also aims to show what kind of uncontrollable social and juridical consequences this expansion of the model of war (or *police* in the form of *war*) is now producing for 'us'.

Mezzadra's description of the 'border war' of Europe does not only refer to statistics of the permanent increase of death cases in some sensitive areas of the 'periphery' (such as the Gibraltar Strait, the sea shores of Sicily and the Adriatic, some passages of the Alps and the Carpaths, and the English Channel and Tunnel), which are recorded officially as casualties or tragic accidents. It involves an analysis of the contradictory effects of the violent security policies waged 'in the name of Europe' by the bordering countries, now aggravated by the conjuncture of the 'global war on terror'.

[17] The expression 'Fortress Europe', now widely used, has been, in particular, the name of the newsletter published by the Swedish columnist Nicholas Busch. Mezzadra, at the University of Bologna, is one of the leading scholars on the history and theory of 'citizenship' in today's European academia (see 2001; 2004). Our discussion started after his essay (with Dal Lago, 2002): which I commented on (2003b, pages 157 – 172). This was followed by Mezzadra's own reply (written with Enrica Rigo, 2003).

These policies in the long run reveal their actual function: at the same time, they tend to *attract and to repel* the migrants, which means installing them in a condition of permanent insecurity.[18] There is, indeed, no question of *suppressing the flows of migrants* towards Europe. These flows are absolutely needed, to reproduce the old 'capitalist reserve army' in a period when a significant part of the 'national' labor force is still (although less and less effectively) protected by social rights and regulations which have been partly 'constitutionalized'. But this means that the new proletarians (in the original sense adopted by Marx, these are workers without a social 'status' or 'recognition') must be transformed into subjects and objects of fear, *experiencing fear* of being rejected and eliminated, and *inspiring fear* in the 'stable' populations. This is supposed to make sure that they will not become integrated into the political 'constituency'—in particular, through their participation in common social struggles, in the end becoming 'citizens' in the active sense, with or without a European passport. However, as we can observe, it is difficult to keep such a politics of fear and insecurity under control. Elementary forms of the protection of civil rights are threatened not only for outsiders but also for *insiders* (a distinction which, when significant communities of migrants are established over several generations, becomes itself dubious).[19]

In the discussion, two other characteristics have been highlighted, which directly concern the 'spatial political' figure of Europe. One is the fact that 'borders' which have a double meaning (local and global) in this sense tend to become really *dislocated*, if not *ubiquitous*. On the one hand, they are replicated by other 'checkpoints' *within the territories* of the European states, wherever militarized police operations are waged against illegal aliens and their supporting 'networks' (ie kin groups, transporters, or hosts). On the other hand—precisely because the quasi-war has a disaggregating effect on the civil peace of European societies, prompting racist reactions, but also unwanted solidarity movements (in short, becoming a disturbing 'political' issue)—attempts are now being made at *transporting the actual borders beyond the borderline*. This seems to be the meaning of the project of 'externalizing the camps'—the filtration centers for refugees, asylum seekers, and illegal migrants—that has been submitted to the European Commission by some governments (Britain, Germany, Italy), and until now rejected by others (notably France and Spain). These camps should be mainly located no longer on the territory of EU member states (such as the infamous camp at Sangatte, near Calais, for migrants trying to reach Britain from the continent), but on the territory of neighboring 'client' states, who would agree to act as auxiliary immigration officers (such as Ukraine, Turkey, Morocco, and Libya). In a sense, this simply reproduces recent colonial relations of dependency, but also retrieves very old patterns of 'territorialization' in the prenational empires. More profoundly, it is a typical aspect of what I would call a *would-be 'power politics'* of Europe, following the model of the capacity to 'project power' beyond the mere territory of the new superstate, but, in fact, illustrating its incapacity to regulate

[18] In the traditional representation, 'nomads' are easily pictured as warriors who plunder the sedentary populations. Now the pattern is reversed: militarized territorialized nations are levying a death tribute on the nomads.

[19] A recent report by the French Commission Citoyens – justice – police, set up in 2002 by the Ligue des Droits de l'Homme, Syndicat de la Magistrature, etc, reveals that 60% of the victims of (reported) illegal violence by police forces (*bavures*) are foreigners, and the huge majority of the other 40% are 'nationals', but with a 'foreign' name or racial profile. This can be read also as demonstrating that nearly half of the victims are mistreated because they are identified with the 'normal' targets (ie 'visible' aliens) (*Libération* 4 – 5 December 2004, page 18; the same information was published in *Le Monde*).

differences and conflicts *within* its own limits, using the capacities of its domestic institutions and societies.[20]

Another characteristic has to do with the *inversion* of the relationship between the concepts of the 'border' and the 'stranger/foreigner'. Apparently, and legally, *foreigners* are those 'other humans' or *strangers* who belong to other nations, who are citizens from different states, either by descent or by adoption, and the borderlines (with the associated institutions such as passports, differential treatments in the public space, different social rights) merely register this preliminary fact. But, increasingly, it is the working of the border, and especially the difference between security borders and mere administrative separations, which constitutes, or 'produces', the stranger/foreigner as a social type. Zygmunt Bauman has written that "all societies produce strangers; but each kind of society produces its own kind of strangers, and produces them in its own inimitable way" (1997, page 17).[21] But we have to deal here with a more institutional process. Since the establishment of a notion of 'European citizenship', individuals from the member states are no longer 'full foreigners' or 'fully strange' to one another in the sense in which individuals from 'third' states (in particular, 'extra-communitarian residents') are *strange* to them. But, of course, the category of the 'thirds' is also split, because all the places of the world are not equivalent from a European (or an American) point of view, in terms of security, economic partnership, cultural difference, etc. We could push to the extreme this idea that the status of borders determines the condition of the stranger/foreigner and the very meaning of 'being foreign', rather than the reverse. Virtually, this category is *dissolved*; there are no longer any 'foreigners' in a simple legal sense, because some are 'assimilated'—they are *less than foreign*, no longer really 'strange', instead becoming 'neighbors'—while others are 'dissimilated'. They are *more than foreign*, as it were, becoming 'absolutely strange' or 'aliens'. As a consequence, inevitably, the category of the 'national' (or the *self*, of what it requires to be the *same*) also becomes split and subject to the dissolving action of 'internal borders' which mirror the global inequalities. Again, there are new, unprecedented aspects in this situation, but also disturbing resurgences of traditional patterns of exclusion which contradict the formal equality associated with the constitutions of the democratic nation-states, such as the categories of 'citizens' and 'subjects' in colonial nations, where the border was also a concentric *double border* (between the metropolis and the subjected territories, between the empire and the rest of the world). Except that this pattern seems now to have been reversed, to strike back upon the 'old' nations.[22]

Now, you may ask, what is the relationship between the issue of borders, the 'production of the foreigner', and the discussions in Europe today among intellectuals, teachers, administrators, on the issue of *translation*? Nation-states have tended in the past (with some notable exceptions) to identify political borders with linguistic borders (or to impose a single dominant idiom within their political borders). With the progressive settling of the religious conflicts in Europe (never completely achieved), and the rise of nationalism in the 21st and 20th century, the *linguistic difference* has become one

[20] See the map of refugee camps and centers of retention for migrants published by http://www.migreurop.org/; the article by Saint-Saens (2004); and the comprehensive study by Caloz-Tschopp (2004).

[21] Bauman's phenomenology of the stranger owes a lot to his great predecessors: Georg Simmel and Alfred Schutz (see the recent commentary by Macherey, 2004).

[22] On the reversal of the splitting effect between center and periphery, see the classical essays in Gilroy (1982). On the ambiguity of the categories of 'national' and 'foreigner' in the colonial empires see Balibar (1992).

of the most sensitive marks of 'collective identity'.[23] However, an absolute coincidence between idioms and territories was never possible in Europe (idioms remained 'shared' among states and nations, and territories remained linguistically 'divided' and, above all, hosted multiple linguistic practices). It was seen and enforced, sometimes violently, as a political and juridical *norm*, not a mere natural or cultural given. But another aspect was equally typical for the constitution of the European historical space: linguistic heterogeneity became institutionalized in the form of mutual processes of *translation* from one language to another (and through languages, from one culture to another, in the fields of art, science, law, literature, philosophy, etc). Translation, either diplomatic, technological, or literary, was never an equalitarian practice, much the contrary: some idioms have been banned by (nationalistic) state regulations, or declared culturally 'inferior', which practically amounts to the same. Today, this is still the case for certain 'regional' idioms, but, above all, for the idioms of immigrant populations, or populations of immigrant descent, which are deemed 'non-European' although they are spoken by great numbers of European residents or citizens, such as Arabic, Turkish, Kurd, Urdu, Wolof, Swahili, or Chinese. The languages of stronger and larger states have been privileged in diplomacy and education. 'Imperial' states have tried with some success to have their 'own' language recognized as 'universal', in the field of commerce and/or culture (which was the case of French in the classical age and of German in *Mitteleuropa* before the catastrophe of Nazism, and, to a greater extent, it has become the case of English today). Translation was never equalitarian, but it is bound to remain in some crucial sense *reciprocal*, and I will return to this.

Several contemporary sociologists and cultural critics have insisted on the importance of translation as a social practice. This is, for instance, the case of Zygmunt Bauman:

> "*Translating* is not an idle occupation for a limited circle of specialists, it is the texture of everyday life, the work that we perform each day and each hour of the day. We are all translators, since *translation is the property common to all forms of life*. It is a necessary aspect of being-in-the world in the 'information society'. Translation is there in every form of communication, in every dialogue. It must be so, because the plurality of voices cannot become eliminated from our existence, which amounts to saying that the borderlines which dissociate and fix meanings will continue to be drawn in a fragmentary and spontaneous manner, even without any superior office of cartography and any official maps from the Geographical Institute... There is a tendency to locate the discrepant combinations in the dialogic activity at different levels of generality, from the specific individual biographies to the characters which are supposed to be common to people from the same social class, the same birthplace, etc, to the differences which supposedly relate to the limitations of the communication between 'communities of meaning'

[23] See Baggioni (1997), who contrasts "the irresistible thrust of territorial monolinguism" with "the counter-example of multilingual States". The dialectical relationship between borders and idioms has been at the core of European philosophy since Fichte and Wilhelm von Humboldt to Saussure and Trubetzkoï at least. In the 'broad' sense of the term, to assign linguistic collective and individual identities is also a form of 'territorialization', and the differences within or without languages can be seen as 'limits' or 'boundaries'. But historically and politically things are very intricate, because geographic territories and linguistic communities seem to be prerequisites for one another: nation-states tend to impose a single dominant language on their territory, as a mark of sovereignty, and even to annex (*anschliessen*) other territories where 'their' national language is spoken, but, on the other side, they need the ideal representation of a language as a relatively unified, 'close' ensemble, therefore as a sign of community, in order to legitimize their claim to represent the population on a given territory. Let us note here that, just as Europe historically has 'invented' the institution of the modern border and projected it all over the world, it has also 'invented' the notion of language as closed identity (idiom) and projected it onto the linguistic practices all over the world.

> (what we usually call 'different cultures'). The consequence would be that such discrepancies pose problems of translation of a different type.... [But] the very concept of a 'stratification' of translation problems is a derivative analytical notion, it is already a product of the labor of translation: it derives from the effort to intellectually assimilate the experience of misunderstanding, which is implicit in the practices of the specialists, the professionals of translation. But not only: what they would describe as examples of failed translation or 'bad' translation work, from the level of mistakes to that of complete misunderstanding, is not necessarily experienced as such by the layman. In the greatest number of daily encounters, where and when we stay with others, we are able to understand each other in the sense of 'knowing how to proceed', as Wittgenstein would say.... The possibility of universalism lies precisely in this common capacity to reach an effective communication without possessing in advance common meanings and interpretations. Universality is not antagonistic with differences; it does not require a 'cultural homogeneity', or a 'cultural purity', much less the kind of practices that are evoked by this ideological notion.... Universality is only the capacity of communication and mutual understanding, which is common to all groups, in the sense of 'knowing how to proceed' reciprocally, but also knowing how to proceed when confronted with others who have the right to proceed in a different manner" (1999, emphasis in original).[24]

This is a crucial view, but it has to be completed with the following consideration: in our political constitutions (in particular, through its association with systems of *mass education*, however defective and unequal they can be, the activity of translation has acquired a political legitimacy. I tend to compare it with the so-called 'European social model'—that is, the system of social rights and collective bargaining which has been created by one and a half centuries of class struggles and more generally social movements against 'pure' liberalism (also because it is experiencing the same deep crisis today). Not only should we, therefore (as students, teachers, parents, and simply citizens), consider it a vital objective to preserve and improve our educational capacities to teach the linguistic skills necessary for translating between multiple languages as a 'daily' practice, but also we should conceive it as a basic instrument to create the European public space in a democratic sense, where ideas and projects (including 'constitutional' projects) not only are circulating among the ruling elites and then redirected from above towards the masses, but can be debated by the citizens themselves across the linguistic and administrative borders. It has been often remarked that there can hardly be a question of an 'active' citizenship—therefore, a democratic polity—without a real circulation of ideas in a 'public sphere' (*öffentlichkeit*). But the *material* condition for such a circulation is not primarily the Internet, much less the *Journal Officiel des Communautés Européennes*; it is a common idiom. Now in Europe there can be no question of imposing one single language for public use (not even the 'universal' language that is increasingly becoming English). But there could and should be a *universalized regime of translations*. In fact, as Umberto Eco (1995) and others have proposed, 'translation' is the common language of Europe.[25]

[24] I retranslate from the Italian edition: *La solitudine del cittadino globale*, Felrinelli editore Milano (2000, pages 201 – 203), at the risk—inherent in translations—of moving far away from the original formulations.

[25] In a number of recent essays, Abram de Swaan (such as 2004) has rightly insisted on the importance and difficulties of the idea of common European linguistic policy, without which there can be no European democracy. However, this idea is systematically ignored by the European treaties and legislative action. This is, once again, the case in the draft constitution, which results in a striking discrepancy between the profusion of rules concerning the economic policies, the security, or the judiciary, and the poverty of principles or objectives concerning the formation of the active citizen.

I would like to further qualify this idea of the political importance of the practice of translation by referring to other aspects of the same experience. These aspects show that it is, indeed, a site of deep tensions and paradoxes. In a recent collection of her essays, Rosi Braidotti, reflecting on the 'existential situation of a multicultural individual', writes:

> "The nomad is perforce a polyglot and the polyglot is a nomad of language, constantly living *between* different idioms. He/she is a specialist of the treachery nature of every language. Words do not remain fixed, they start to wander in their autonomous manner, here and there, along preexisting semantic pathways, leaving behind them acoustical traces written or unconscious ... so that, when a book [which has been thought and written across several languages] goes to print, it is already like a translation without an original text, a philosophical work without a referential mother-tongue, made of successive translations and displacements .... Nomadism is not only a theoretical option, it proves to be also an existential condition which expresses itself in a determinate style of thought" (2002, pages 22f).

I agree with this formulation, at least as an ideal case, but it is important to see that this form of nomadism is rooted in educational institutions, and directly depends on their capacity to adapt and develop their potentialities in the 'postnational' era, both from the point of view of their mass dimension and from the point of view of their normative models. We know that individuals and groups who are using and mastering several languages are also able to make use of their 'mother tongue' in the most elaborate manner. And, conversely, individuals and groups who are culturally and socially barred from the complex use of their 'own' language (although this situation has to be discussed with a critical eye, it is, in part, a class stereotype projected onto the 'poor' or the 'subalterns' by the dominant groups, whose linguistic habits are legitimized at the expense of others, as Pierre Bourdieu and others have shown) tend to reject the possibility of becoming 'polyglots', viewing it as though it were as a forbidden or unacceptable privilege. As a consequence, such individuals and groups are not merely *rooted* or embedded in specific (limited) linguistic territories, but actually *enclosed* as if in a 'prison house',[26] prevented from 'traveling' beyond its limits. This paradoxically, in a world of transnational communications, increasingly works as a form of *exile*, an 'interior' exile from the contemporary world, producing the same anxieties and feelings of powerlessness. Again, we are confronted here with conflictual processes of 'territorialization' and 'deterritorialization'. We might say that translation in all its forms, as a 'spontaneous', a 'pragmatic', as well as an 'elaborated' institutional practice, is a form of *virtual deterritorialization*, which makes it possible to anticipate and control political processes where the borders are displaced and the meaning of borders is transformed. Therefore, it makes it possible also to 'appropriate' or 'inhabit' a transnational political space and transform it into a new public sphere. A great deal in the future of Europe as a 'community of citizens' depends on whether and to what extent the mass of citizens in Europe will have access to this practice which represents their real 'common' idiom (Baggioni, 1997, pages 335 – 363).

Reciprocity and conflict are, therefore, the categories that must be associated with the idea of translation, but also in a different sense, which I want to associate with a complementary reflection on the *limits of translation* and the *untranslatable* (*intraduisible*). This does not only refer to the fact that the 'perfect' translation is impossible—that there are irreducible remainders or obstacles which prevent us from finding an equivalent for a given idea when passing from one language to another, because the idea would belong to different 'communities of meaning'—although this is the most immediate result of our

[26] I borrow the expression from Jameson (1972), although I am using it in a different sense.

experience of using different languages. This limitation was more or less the idea that we found in Bauman when he referred to the 'mutual understanding' that takes place when the communication is not transparent: it would simply set an infinite *task* of broadening the limits and working towards the elimination of misunderstandings. But I am referring to the more disturbing fact that, in a deeper sense, languages are intrinsically *untranslatable* (which also means that, let us note, none of them is 'superfluous', not only for its 'indigenous' *speakers*, but also for its *nonspeakers* as well), because they represent incompatible 'choices' among possibilities of meaning and thought. Languages or idioms not only have specific 'geniuses', as the classical tradition used to say, but, above all, have been shaped by specific histories involving creeds, experiences, and institutions, as much as they shaped them. To take a few burning examples, *laïcité* in French clearly does not mean the same as *secularism* or *Sekularisierung*; *pravda* in Russian does not mean the same as *vérité* or *truth* (which are not equivalent themselves); *law* in Britain (hence, the 'rule of law') does not mean the same as *loi* or *Gesetz* (hence, the difficulty of deciding what a 'European law' or 'rule of law' could be);[27] *jihad* in Arabic does not mean the same as *Holy War* and *guerre sainte*, etc. The reality is, therefore, a contradictory one: languages are constantly *translated* (meaning: people actually communicate by using different languages, and passing from one to another), *and* they remain *untranslatable* (meaning that they do not express the *same* ideas or contents, but *different* and conflicting ideas).[28] This could be also expressed in the following way: the *common ground* (or *common territory*) of languages, where the *practice of communication*—Habermas's *Kommunikatives Handeln* (communicative action)—actually takes place, is not a given one, either materially (in a system of values) or ideally (in a system of rules); it is a constructed one, which means that it has to be constantly reconstructed, *built again* (and *against*), by confronting the obstacles in a dialogic manner, 'forcing' the incompatibilities and inventing new 'universals'.

I have become more and more convinced that this conflictual model of the process of translation (which, as opposed to the technological representation of the network of global communications, we might call the *philological model*, where differences are neither denied nor absolutized, but subjected to the political and historical practices of translation),[29] at the same time, *provides an instrument* (not sufficient, to be sure), and features a *regulating ideal* for the political handling of the issues of 'multiculturalism'. When applied to the European political space, the philological model shares many of the formal characteristics of the representation that I have called 'crossover', since

[27] See the entries "Etat de droit" and "Law/Right" (both by Philippe Raynaud), "Pravda" (by Konstantin Sigov), and "Sécularisation" (by Marc de Launay) in Cassin (2004).

[28] This idea of the 'double bind' inherent in the practice of translation was expressed, in particular, by Derrida (1987) in his commentary to Walter Benjamin's *Die Aufgabe des Übersetzers*. It proved entirely relevant in the collective work of the *Vocabulaire européen des philosophies* (Cassin, 2004) to which I contributed several entries. The case of philosophy is highly revealing, and perhaps extreme, but it is not an isolated one in the field of culture. In her general introduction (where she describes translation as a *political task* in today's Europe, rejecting at the same time the myth of the *universal language*, or the *universalization of a single language*, and the *incommunicability* of linguistic, therefore also cultural universes), Cassin writes that "*Intraduisibles* (*untranslatable words*) are symptoms of differences [among languages]... but to speak of *intraduisibles* does not imply that words, expressions, syntactic and grammatical forms are not and can never be translated: rather, they are continuously translated, their translation is a never ending process, giving rise to ceaseless *inventions* [in the different languages]" (page XVII, emphasis in original). Such inventions ('neologisms', in the technical terminology) are in this sense the *common work* of the languages, through their translators.

[29] This idea is influenced once again by the work of Said (2004). On *jihad* and the twin term *ijtihad*, see 2004 (pages 68 – 69).

most of the main national languages of Europe are also international languages. This is a result, in particular, of past migrations and the legacy of the colonial history: English, but also French, Spanish, Russian, even Dutch and Italian. And a considerable number of languages from all over the world—neighboring or remote countries—are now used on the European territories. But the philological model is also materially intertwined in the practices of the communication age (such as the Internet and satellite televisions), challenging them and challenged by them. At the same time, it should allow us to tackle the conflictual issues involved in the construction of multicultural societies, and to displace them. We need, namely, to overcome twin prejudices: what we might call the hypothesis of the 'state of nature among cultures' (the idea that cultures are *unchanging* and *closed* totalities, which must be 'at war' with one another, metaphorically or even literally), and the hypothesis of *preestablished harmony* (the idea that all cultures, be they ethnic or religious or social, *have the same universal 'human' content*, albeit expressed in different ways). *Culture* is, in many respects, a misleading word: what it covers are actually *discourses*, *narratives* which are dominant or dominated, and crystallize identities. To imagine that cultures could become compatible without individuals circulating between them (as 'nomads', 'strangers') is meaningless, but it is equally absurd to imagine this mediation to take place without a dialogic practice, and the intervention of the language(s) in which narratives are translated and compared, to the point of their irreducible differences, or where they become 'untranslatable'. However, this point is not 'fixed'; it is dependent itself on the available modalities of translation or codes. This is especially important, but not unique, in the case of religious discourses and narratives, which are the main stake in the permanent conflict between revival and 'routinization'—sacralization of the tradition and modernization or 'rationalization', to put it in Weberian terms. We should abandon the illusion that different religions, different moral and juridical systems of representations, different esthetic ideals in the world (and even within Europe) are complementary elements of one single 'human culture', or one single 'civilization', but we should not accept either the idea that they 'clash' by nature, since they have no 'nature'. They have a history, and it is the unending process of translation that reflects and allows them to transform this history.

This is also where, I believe, the issue of idioms and translations once again crosses the issue of borders. History can be used either to 'essentialize' the conflicting narratives, enclosing them within 'cultural borderlines', or to subject 'subaltern' narratives to the 'dominant' ones (and simply to silence them). Or it can be used to set up a dialectical transformation of the regime of discourses. Educational programs addressing the construction of a 'mass polyglotism' in Europe today are of necessity taking into account, at the same time, the 'interior' and 'exterior' aspects of cultural diversity, which are no longer entirely separated. They are concerned with the necessity of bridging the gap between European nations as closed communities, which the European construction as it was developed up to now has hardly filled. On the contrary—no doubt also because of economic circumstances, and because the political class sees no interest in opening the boundaries, but also because part of the 'societies' themselves develops a kind of *defense mechanism* against the conflictual character of transnationalization which has been officially *denied*—we can have the depressing impression that the *nations or peoples* are more isolated now that the institutions are creating more interdependencies. But such educational programs, which would transform Europe also into a 'society of learning' (see Scanzio, 1998),[30] are equally

[30] In the introduction of the volume, Giorgio Baratta (head of the program 'Immaginare l'Europa') and Antonio Ruberti (European Commissioner for Research and Education, 1993–95) discuss the relationship between education and *borders* in the broad sense (between states, learning and professional training, disciplines, and cultures) (pages 5–13).

concerned with the necessity of including 'foreign' communities who are now actively contributing to the construction of Europe—which practically means *not enclosing them* in cultural ghettoes and urban peripheries under custody. Removing internal borders and democratizing external borders in 'borderland Europe'. The current difficulty, or incapacity, of Europeans (as it is expressed by their official politics) to accept what they (confusedly) see as 'non-European' (or 'anti-European') is also a symptom of their incapacity to understand, acknowledge, and transform their own 'domestic' multiplicity. But, conversely, it is only when we will prove able to make productive use of this internal diversity—instead of reducing it to national or civilizational stereotypes ('Christian Europe', 'the West', etc), or subjecting it to 'common policies' which cover only dreams of hegemony (Europe as a new 'world power', or 'world actor') or fears of invasion and insecurity—that we may prove able to work through our internal and external relationship to 'others', from neighbors to strangers.

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Allow me to summarize briefly the path that I have been following. Europe—this Europe that has proclaimed its will to become politically 'constituted'—cannot exist if it does not configure a political space. But, in today's world, political spaces are projected inside the framework of 'globalization', or against what is perceived as its dominant tendency. This can be done in very different forms, along opposite lines. In this situation, I am trying to offer an alternative to the dominant models ('clash-of-civilizations', 'global network', 'center versus periphery') which I call 'borderland Europe', starting with the idea that a political space could (and perhaps should) be imagined in terms of overlapping open regions. This is not an institutional model, although it would have institutional consequences, ranging from the democratization of border controls to the generalization of multiple-citizenship status and the inclusion of 'migrant languages' in the linguistic map and the educational landscape of Europe. It is primarily intended as a critical notion to dig out some of the contradictions that are affecting the 'constitution' of Europe in its present state. These contradictions are not simple 'defects' or 'mistakes'; they are not even a result of the 'bad choices' of certain policies against others, albeit these choices practically matter and could take us into dead ends. They arise from the fact that the construction of this supranational entity is taking place in a world where the territorial notions of 'interior' and 'exterior' are no longer completely separable, not even in a legal manner. This is the ultimate root of the 'perverse' processes which transform security before our eyes into greater insecurity, or the preservation of identities into a new form of exile from oneself and from the world. 'Borderland' is the name of the place where the opposites flow into one another, where 'strangers' can be at the same time stigmatized and indiscernible from 'ourselves', where the notion of citizenship, involving at the same time *community* and *universality,* once again confronts its intrinsic antinomies. I want to conclude by returning to this notion, and raising the issue of a 'transnational' (rather than 'postnational') figure of citizenship, which takes place within borders and beyond borders.

Again, there is no question here of suggesting direct institutional solutions. We must follow institutional debates as closely as possible, not only for the sake of realism, but, also, more profoundly, because we know that *citizenship*, by definition, is an institution; it is in a sense *the institution of institutions*, which commands all the others. However, we must be aware that such notions can receive no unanimously accepted definition; they are not even precisely defined. They try to describe certain conflictual tendencies of the present stage, which seem to be 'knocking at the door' when we look at the huge transformations that the social conditions and moral values associated with the *classical* notion of citizenship have received. But they are certainly not anticipating

yet any specific institution which would already characterize a new stage in the history of citizenship. The *ancient model* of citizenship—within 'city states' which could rule over 'world empires', in Ancient Greece, Rome, the Medieval 'republics' and '*Freistädte*—was mainly defined in terms of the *self-government* of a closed 'community of citizens' tied together by patriotism and divided by the struggles of patricians and plebeians. The *modern model* of *national citizenship* progressively evolved (over two centuries, and with many varieties)[31] from the male-dominated model of revolutionary bourgeois states, where the *universalistic* dimension of citizenship is proclaimed as *equal liberty*, but remains in practice contradicted by exclusionary categorizations which distinguish between 'active' and 'passive' citizenship, to the later model of the national social (welfare) state, where class, gender, and race discriminations are officially condemned and to some extent combated, while the 'cosmopolitical' horizon becomes less and less relevant, with the more or less complete identification of 'citizenship' and 'nationality'. What we are now witnessing are *tendencies* taking us beyond these steps. But while we can assert with some credibility that the previous models of citizenship are no longer viable in their original form (which is not to say that they are not contributing names, concepts, ideals, to our political culture), and *a new institution of the citizen* is bound to emerge (unless we believe that citizenship as such, barely distinguishable from the status of individuals and groups acting politically in a democracy, will disappear, which *is not impossible*), we cannot make blueprints for the new institution, if only because it will entirely depend on the way in which, in the present or the future, certain social and cultural conflicts will evolve, and the intrinsic antinomies of the idea of 'transnational citizenship' are resolved. This, almost certainly, means a very long and hazardous process.

I shall qualify my own remarks, however. Institutions to come are necessary, perhaps inevitable, and also unpredictable in their final form, but they cannot bear no relationship at all with what, in other places, I called 'the workshops of democracy' that are opening in our present societies, where ideas are tested and actors are trained (Balibar, 2003c, pages 155 – 179). My thesis is this: transnational citizenship will exist or not (this is contingent), but, if it takes shape progressively, it must mark a progress in several areas of democratic life, ranging from the recognition of social rights to the possibilities of self-government. This is not contingent; it is a necessary implication, the absolute condition for the 'acceptability' of the European model of institutions by the *populations* (or the 'masses') of contemporary citizens, who will not *abandon* a status, however insufficient and damaged, which encapsulates certain rights and powers, in favor of another one meaning less equality, freedom, solidarity, control over the government, etc—except perhaps under the impact of fear, threat, pressure from exceptional circumstances (or a *state of exception*), therefore in the most fragile and unstable manner.

If we now return to the question of 'political spaces', the question of the 'territory' of the new citizen, we are facing two crucial issues. One has to do with the question whether there is a room for a specifically *European* 'community of the citizens', as an 'open' federation, *between* the two opposite models of a *reproduction of the national model at a higher level* (the proper 'supranational' project) and the *regulatory ideal of cosmopolitical citizenship* (whose practical side could be an *international* rule of law enforced by multinational global institutions). Please note that this is not simply the question of 'federation'. It is quite clear that Europe will take the constitutional form

[31] In a sense, it was the pride of every nation-state to have invented a 'singular' form of civic participation in public affairs, and raised it to the level of universality. This typical process was part of what, borrowing Luhmann's category, Bielefeld (2003) has called the 'self-modeling' of nations, showing its competitive character.

of a federation, but the concept of 'federation' is itself bound to evolve; it will have to invent a way out of the classic dilemmas of homogeneity and heterogeneity, sovereignty and subsidiarity.[32] The key debate was launched by Habermas some years ago when he developed the idea of the 'postnational constellation', describing the EU as an *intermediary step* towards the realization of the cosmopolitical ideal: therefore, not a practice of the 'democratization of borders', but, rather, a lesser evil before their complete relativization (see Habermas, 1999; 2001). Clearly, the Maastricht Treaty, whose 'definition' of 'European citizenship' is reproduced in the latest project of a constitution for Europe, goes exactly in the opposite direction: it is more than ever based on the 'national' model, which can either mean that the 'national preconditions' for the acquisition of European citizenship are preserved (therefore, excluding the 'nomadic nations', even if they are, in fact, largely *stabilized*, but lacking an official territory within the boundaries of Europe, which is the 'passport' into the 'community of citizens', *Europa der Bürger*), or that the 'European citizenship' becomes a *supranational institution*, in practice an 'empire', ruling out the possibility of creating an equalitarian model of 'multiple political space', where the political power *circulates* across nations, but does not replace and suppress them.

Another difficult question concerns the 'actors' that are likely to incarnate the figure of the new transnational citizen, setting up as it were 'models' for the *constituent power* of the new constitution, and rallying the 'old citizens' either against the existing conceptions of citizenship (what in an ancient language we might call the 'revolutionary way'), or, in a more gradual but also probably more effective way, in the project of *overcoming* them, transforming them from the inside, and giving them a new content. In my conception, the 'new citizens' are not only *transnational activists*, or members of NGOs and other organizations who work across the borders, however helpful and exemplary their contribution can be, but also 'ordinary' citizens who express their demands and expectations from a *European* point of view, unmediated by national and supranational bureaucracies, or join efforts with foreigners (including refugees, and legal and illegal aliens) to uphold basic human and civil rights. What makes every form of transnational mobilization of the rank and file enormously important—such as the antiwar protest in nearly all European capitals and big cities just before the beginning of the second Gulf War (but this is only a temporary and negative 'anti-American' type of mobilization)—is precisely the fact that they *pluralize* the practice of politics, and peacefully *'destroy' the monopoly of representation* that the 'political class' has acquired, with very ambiguous effects on the public spirit. Seeking its own interest and/or claiming to represent the only genuine expertise in the complex global confrontations, the political class has monopolized the *mediating* position between national administrations and the new 'central' bureaucracy, which also (not by chance) tends to eliminate the practice of translation in favor of global monolingualism, and act as a protective shield of the corporate lobbies. But, given that an increasing number of political decisions, which directly or indirectly affect the lives of the citizens, can be made only in the form of agreements reached after negotiations between 'national' and 'supranational' bureaucracies, this has also considerably reduced the capacity of the civil societies in each particular state to actually control, influence, and, in the end, shape the politics of their national government, as every union activist knows by experience.[33]

The link between these two issues seems to me to be: to find a way out of the seemingly absolute antinomy of supranationalism and cosmopolitanism is also to

[32] I am relying here on the work of Beaud (2004, pages 110 – 129).

[33] This is the crucial problem of the 'feedback effects' of the European construction as it is currently conceived on the 'democratic level' of the member states. See also the very interesting contributions in Beaud et al (2004), which are summarized in the introductory essay by Beaud and Strudel.

address the paradox that marks the history of *political agency* in the institution of the modern citizen. With the exception of some critical periods, a growing gap has been separating 'active citizenship' in its various forms: *Berufspolitiker* à la Weber, but also political activists, revolutionaries, 'organic intellectuals' à la Gramsci, and 'passive citizenship', as a combination of representative democracy and social dependency. The paradoxical contradiction of almost unlimited extensions of citizenship as a status and its more and more formal, nonsubstantial character leads me to discuss in a fresh manner the possibilities for common citizens to occupy the 'strategic place' located at the (multiple) junctions of the national and the global space; not the place of absolute sovereignty but the place of mediation, not the place of border enforcement, but of border crossing.

We discuss the present and future of Europe from the point of view of a 'constituent process' because, as a matter of fact, a draft *constitution* has been elaborated and is now going to be submitted to the national parliaments or constituencies, following different procedures of ratification. There will be 'national campaigns' *pro et contra*, heavily influenced—which is 'normal'—by local issues of power and national histories. With few exceptions (all the more remarkable), the ruling elites will tend to control these debates; they will ensure a complete *isolation* of the discussions and the clashes within the borders of the different countries and languages, which is a way to immunize the already established supranational structures against their consequences. And they will be helped to do so by the 'passivity' of the masses, who either *do not believe* in the possibility of crossing the borders or view it as an alienating process, a process of dispossession of their political status. This, given the *subject* of the debate, is a paradox, since most of the 'burning' issues in the European societies—including unemployment and productivity, taxes and social budgets, social rights and protections, the role of immigration, the economic, diplomatic, and military place of Europe in the global space, its relationships to the American 'hyperpower' or the conflicts in the Middle East—are identical or can be addressed only through common policies. But it is more than a paradox: a 'performative contradiction' or a *practical refutation* of the objective of building a new *common* public sphere. How could such a space be common—hence, public—without a circulation of ideas, discourses, speakers, and a flow of translations? We are thus in a dead end, in the middle of the contradiction, voting and acting in a formally *transnational* but materially split, entirely *partitioned* political space. It is from this dead ending way that I want to sidestep—and that I urge our fellow intellectuals to sidestep—by returning to the long-term issues of the 'constitution of Europe', in order to clarify what has not been clarified yet, at least as *problems*.

The European 'project' is a long-term one with a *past*—actually several pasts, or a past that went through opposite stages, and turned politically already several times since the Rome Treaty. It is not *perceived* yet in the same way, through the same 'myths', in different regions and different social groups of Europe. But now, in a global conjuncture that, many of us would agree, is perilous, the project itself is at risk because it must rethink itself as a project of creation of a political space across borders that has never existed in history, and because—less than ever—external forces (be it the American hegemony, or the contagious disease of the Middle East, or the 'demographic pressure' from the ex-colonial world) remain 'outside'. It suddenly appears that *traditional, internal borders* within Europe (ie between the 'peoples' of Europe) are much more rigid, lasting, impenetrable than what they are supposed to have already become. And that the *new, external borders* are much more penetrable, and less stable and fixed than what they are supposed to remain. 'Europe as borderland' is not a solution or a prospect. It is, rather, a 'fact', or a name for the accumulation of facts and problems that call for choices: first of all, the choice to deny them or to acknowledge them.

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